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INTRODUCTION

Media reports identified at least 50 of the 130 victims of the
recent California fires as undocumented immigrants;1 some of
2
them suffered severe burns or burned to death. Paralleling
similar language employed by Professor Kevin Johnson’s
characterization of immigrants as “the silent victims of the
3
deadly [Hurricane Katrina],” a news report labeled this group
4
“The Unseen Victims of California’s Wildfires.” This same
account criticized the relief efforts in the Southern California
fires, otherwise praised as effective, as “miss[ing] a population
that has long been in the shadows: undocumented workers living
5
along San Diego’s hillsides and canyons.” These “essential [farm]
workers,” an estimated 1,600 of them, the sympathetic report
continued, “have slipped through the cracks in the county’s relief
and evacuation efforts—so much so that Mexican government
6
officials are filling in the gaps.” Immigrant advocacy groups
complained that evacuation orders restricted access to the
7
migrant workers, impeding their efforts to assist them. In
addition to these imposed physical barriers, workers’ distrust in
rescue efforts or fear of being fired meant that many chose to
stay close to the farms where they worked, without electricity,
8
water supply, or sanitation. And again, much in the same way as
9
described by Johnson about the immigrant hurricane victims,
these workers could likely be “left out of the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA)’s relief aid because, without
10
papers, they have very limited access to FEMA funds.”
1. Undocumented Immigrants Victims of California Fires, NEW AMERICA MEDIA,
Nov. 1, 2007, http://news.newamericamedia.org/news/view_article.html?article_id=
46a62875f444fc2abe4969db0c1f2bdf.
2. See Immigrants Faced “Climate of Intimidation” in California Fires, WORLD
WAR 4 REPORT, Nov. 5, 2007, http://www.ww4report.com/node/4639 (reporting instances
in which undocumented migrants suffered fatal and nonfatal burn injuries).
3. Kevin R. Johnson, Hurricane Katrina: Lessons About Immigrants in the Modern
Administrative State, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 11, 14 (2008).
4. Amanda Martinez, The Unseen Victims of California’s Wildfires, NEW AMERICA
MEDIA, Oct. 26, 2007, http://news.newamericamedia.org/news/view_article.html?article_id
=d70074999a1b81cef632488c949812aa.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. See id. (describing conditions faced by undocumented immigrant workers); see
also Jim Avila et al., Dangerous Dilemma for Illegal Immigrants, ABC NEWS, Oct. 24,
2007, http://abcnews.go.com/2020/story?id=3769989&page=1 (reporting that despite
evacuation orders some employers made the agricultural workers stay to save the crops).
9. See Johnson, supra note 3, at 53 (chronicling undocumented workers’ inability
to gain access to meaningful hurricane relief aid).
10. Martinez, supra note 4.
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11
Mistreatment of immigrants in these California fires was
12
unfortunately reminiscent of the Hurricane Katrina story.
Despite reports that immigrants caught in the fire were too
afraid to seek help, the San Diego County Office of Emergency
Management called upon 300 U.S. Border Patrol agents to help
13
with emergency relief. For safety control, Border Patrol agents
were directed to watch for looters and monitor neighborhoods
14
affected by the fires. Yet, despite assurances from the federal
15
government that immigration raids would stop, Border Patrol
continued to enforce immigration laws against immigrants
16
during the local relief efforts. More than 200 immigrants were
apprehended during the fires, reportedly while trying to cross
17
into the United States. The reality is, however, that an
estimated two million undocumented immigrants live and work
18
in the California hills where the fires occurred, and it is unclear
how Border Patrol could (or would) distinguish between old and
new immigrants.
Immigration enforcement and racial profiling also occurred
at Qualcomm Stadium, where volunteers questioned evacuees
19
about their immigration status. The Los Angeles Times reported
that U.S. Border Patrol agents arrested six Mexican nationals at
20
Qualcomm Stadium for allegedly stealing food and water. The

11. See generally Randal C. Archibold, Residents Flee Wildfires in Southern
California, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2007, at A20 (providing an overview of the California
wildfires).
12. See Johnson, supra note 3, at 54 (documenting the immigration raids that took
place at Hurricane Katrina’s relief centers).
13. See Martinez, supra note 4 (reporting on the help of U.S. Border Patrol with
emergency relief efforts).
14. Id.
15. See Avila et al., supra note 8 (describing government immigration enforcement
activities during wildfire relief efforts).
16. See Martinez, supra note 4 (recounting the arrest of six undocumented
immigrants at Qualcomm Stadium, for reportedly “stealing from the people in need”).
17. Id. (describing Border Patrol activities along the U.S.–Mexican border during
the fires).
18. Avila et al., supra note 8 (noting estimated population of illegal workers living
in areas affected by the fires).
19. See Immigrants Faced “Climate of Intimidation” in California Fires, supra note
2 (relaying ACLU charges that immigrants faced a hostile environment at the stadium).
20. Anna Gorman, Six Illegal Immigrants Arrested at Qualcomm, L.A. TIMES:
BLOGS: BREAKING NEWS, http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/breakingnews/2007/10/sixundocumente.html (Oct. 24, 2007, 02:12 PM) (relating account of immigrants’ arrest).
Anti-immigrant bloggers immediately responded to the story to praise the treatment of
immigrants as outsiders: “[T]hese people respect nothing . . . . I have compassion for my
own and will not sacrifice this great nation for a pathetic unevolved culture that has no
intention of [assimilating] into this nation.” Posting of John MacIntosh to United for a
Sovereign America (USA), http://immigrationbuzz.com/?p=1335 (Oct. 26, 2007, 7:36 PM).
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brief story, however, failed to investigate whether any of the
persons involved in the alleged theft were victims of the fire.21
Another incident more clearly involved the deportation of fire
victims. On October 24, San Diego police arrested an evacuated
Mexican family of seven—four adults with three children ages
two, eight, and thirteen—as they tried to leave Qualcomm
22
Stadium. The police turned the family over to Border Patrol
23
agents, who deported all of them that evening. The family from
Tijuana reported that a volunteer at Qualcomm Stadium called
the police, “claiming that the family was taking more than their
24
share of material aid.” At least five police officers aggressively
questioned the family regarding their immigration status and
called Border Patrol, despite the San Diego Police Department’s
25
official policy not to collaborate with the immigration agency. At
Qualcomm Stadium, not only was the Border Patrol invited to set
up an informational tent regarding the fire locations, but “San
Diego city police walked around the stadium, waking up families
and checking for identification” to verify that every person came
26
from an evacuated zone. The homeless and immigrants without
identification were particularly affected by these procedures, and
many were apprehensive of being subject to an immigration
27
inspection.
These stories of theft are eerily similar to the depictions of
the mostly black victims of Hurricane Katrina who were
portrayed as criminals, rather than as victims, for trying to get
28
food from abandoned stores in the hurricane’s aftermath.
Unfortunately, the criminalization of immigrants is all too
common, even in circumstances that should evoke empathy, not
disdain. The illegality of immigrants often has justified the
viewpoints of immigration agencies about who is to blame for
their victimization. Such agency attitudes are evident in

21. See Gorman, supra note 20 (excluding any report about whether the alleged
theft was committed by a victim of the fires).
22. Immigrants Faced “Climate of Intimidation” in California Fires, supra note 2.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. The Forgotten Victims of the California Wildfires: Undocumented Migrant Workers
(Democracy Now! broadcast Oct. 29, 2007), available at http://www.democracynow.org/
2007/10/29/the_forgotten_victims_of_the_california (interviewing Andrea Guerrero, Chair
of San Diego Immigrant Rights Consortium).
27. See id. (explaining reasons for immigrants’ apprehension in seeking wildfire
relief).
28. See, e.g., Looters Take Advantage of the New Orleans Mess, MSNBC.COM, Aug.
30, 2005, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/9131493 (describing various items, including food
and clothing, taken from stores by Katrina victims).

2008]

SILENT VICTIMS NO MORE?

77

examples that include the Immigration and Customs
Enforcement’s views on family separation during raids29 and the
30
pattern of victim blaming in human trafficking cases, not to
mention the treatment of immigrants as undeserving victims—or
even criminals—during Hurricane Katrina and the California
31
fires.
Quite appropriately, therefore, Johnson draws broader
lessons from Hurricane Katrina on the treatment of immigrants
32
by the modern administrative state. Johnson characterizes
much of the troubles that plague the immigration bureaucracy as
“symptomatic of a more general failure of American democracy—
the lack of political accountability of the immigration
33
bureaucracy to the persons most directly affected by its actions.”
More specifically, he questions the application of the judicial
deference logic of Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources
34
Defense Council, Inc. to administrative agencies’ interpretation
of statutes, particularly as applied to immigration agencies that
35
lack political accountability. In drawing this conclusion,
Johnson considers but rejects the possibility that “virtual
representation” by other citizen voters and activists could be
36
sufficient to protect the rights of immigrants. Ultimately, he is
not arguing to extend immigrants the right to vote, although his
position appears to rest on legal and pragmatic impediments
37
rather than normative judgments. Thus, when more directly
addressing “how we can make agencies more accountable to the

29. See Oskar Garcia, Study: Raids Risk Kids’ Mental Health, ABC NEWS, Oct. 31,
2007, http://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory?id=3802560 (cataloguing negative effects on
children caused by the arrest of immigrant parents).
30. See Marisa Silenzi Cianciarulo, Modern-Day Slavery and Cultural Bias:
Proposals for Reforming the U.S. Visa System for Victims of International Human
Trafficking, 7 NEV. L.J. 826, 832–33 (2007) (suggesting that current immigration
enforcement policies may encourage bias against human trafficking victims).
31. See supra notes 19–28 and accompanying text (discussing racial profiling by
authorities).
32. See Johnson, supra note 3, at 19 (arguing that the government’s treatment of
immigrants during Hurricane Katrina exemplifies the government’s system-wide poor
treatment of immigrants).
33. Id.
34. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–45
(1984) (setting forth explicitly what has now been termed “Chevron deference”).
35. See Johnson, supra note 3, at 20 (positing that Chevron deference logic is
inappropriately applied to immigration agency decisions).
36. Id. at 40 (stating that “virtual representation” cannot equate to direct
representation).
37. Id. at 42 (arguing that while the vote need not be extended to immigrants, the
faulty rationale for application of Chevron deference to immigration decisions demands
stricter judicial review).
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needs of noncitizens,”38 Johnson concludes that “[a]t a minimum,
careful judicial review of agency decisions pertaining to
immigrants is necessary to ensure some modicum of a check of
bureaucratic error and abuse in our system of checks and
39
balances.”
Johnson is not looking to the courts as the sole solution to
the plight of immigrants at the hands of the administrative state,
but he is making the strong moral claim that courts must step up
to protect them: “One could forcefully argue that careful judicial
review is most necessary when the agency’s competence,
independence, and impartiality have been seriously questioned.
Especially in instances involving critically important decisions
affecting a discrete and insular (and disenfranchised) minority,
basic due process concerns militate in favor of meaningful
40
judicial review.” An underlying basis for Johnson’s position
appears to be a strong disillusionment with a political climate
that is increasingly hostile to immigrants. The article’s
description of the legal landscape plaguing immigrants includes
Congress’s passage of laws that treat immigrants in “draconian
41
Additionally, Congress recently failed to pass
fashion.”
legislation remedying the extreme vulnerability and uncertainty
of approximately twelve million undocumented immigrants who
42
live in the United States. In June 2007, the comprehensive
immigration reform bill that would have offered undocumented
43
persons a path to legalization failed to get the sixty votes
needed to end the debate in the Senate and have it pass for a
44
vote. Then, in October 2007, came the more surprising defeat of
45
the DREAM Act of 2007, which similarly fell short of receiving
the votes needed. The DREAM Act would have provided a path to
legalization for undocumented youth brought as children to the

38. Id. at 57.
39. Id. at 71.
40. Id. at 31.
41. Id. at 22.
42. See JEFFREY S. PASSEL, PEW HISPANIC CTR., THE SIZE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF
THE UNAUTHORIZED MIGRANT POPULATION IN THE U.S.: ESTIMATES BASED ON THE MARCH
2005 CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY i (2006), available at http://pewhispanic.org/files/
reports/61.pdf (estimating current U.S. population of unauthorized immigrants).
43. Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act, S. 1348, 110th Cong. (2007).
44. Klaus Marre, 46–53, Immigration Bill Goes Down in Defeat, THE HILL, June 28,
2007, http://thehill.com/leading-the-news/immigration-bill-goes-down-in-defeat-2007-0628.html.
45. Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors (DREAM) Act, S. 2205,
110th Cong. (2007).
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United States who pursued an education or joined the military in
the United States.46
Professor Johnson’s moral call upon the courts to protect
immigrant rights seems obviously urgent in this climate of antiimmigrant political hostility. Yet, in this very same political
climate, the judiciary is unlikely to respond to the plight of
immigrants in the absence of substantial political backing of a
pro-immigrant civil rights movement. Political scientists have
time and again deemed courts as part of the national political
47
coalition. Indeed, courts’ decisionmaking “is strongly influenced
48
by national political majorities and national public opinion . . . .”
This point has not escaped consideration by Johnson when
49
writing about the struggle for Latino civil rights. Specifically on
the role of courts in immigration, he has expressed reserved
enthusiasm that judicial review can truly advance immigrant
50
rights. While citing studies finding that judicial review of
executive implementation of immigration laws in the 1980s
overturned a significant number of cases in favor of immigrants,
courts largely left intact the deep structural flaws in the
51
immigration bureaucracy. Professor Johnson recently made this
point more emphatically when he and Professor Bill Ong Hing
reflected on the Immigration Rights Marches of 2006. They
wrote:
Although the courts at times have facilitated social change,
today’s courts are not especially prone to do so. . . . Leading
46. Id. (providing a path to potential legal permanent residence for anyone who,
among other requirements, came to the United States prior to his or her sixteenth
birthday and has either attained a high school diploma or its equivalent, or been admitted
to an institution of higher learning).
47. Jack M. Balkin, What Brown Teaches Us About Constitutional Theory, 90 VA. L.
REV. 1537, 1538 (2004) (citing Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The
Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279, 279 (1957)); see also Gregory
C. Sisk et al., Charting the Influences on the Judicial Mind: An Empirical Study of
Judicial Reasoning, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1377, 1387–88 (1998) (concluding that party
affiliation is a more salient factor in judicial decisionmaking than gender or race).
48. Balkin, supra note 47, at 1538.
49. In 1995, for example, Dean Johnson contrasted Brown v. Board of Education,
347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954), which mandated the desegregation of public schools, with Plyler
v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982), which granted undocumented students the right to K–12
public education, “[to demonstrate] the need for political action to accompany a litigation
strategy in order to successfully bring about social change.” Kevin R. Johnson, Civil
Rights and Immigration: Challenges for the Latino Community in the Twenty-First
Century, 8 LA RAZA L.J. 42, 44 (1995). He noted then that “[w]hile Brown was a part of a
much larger social movement, Plyler was not.” Id. As a result, the aftermath of Plyler
faced a great deal of post anti-immigrant organizing to try to overturn its ruling in the
absence of a concerted strong political base to counter those efforts. Id. at 48.
50. Johnson, supra note 49, at 46–47.
51. Id. at 47.
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Democrats and civil rights advocates have expressed
distress and pessimism about the future of a conservative
judiciary. . . . Such a judiciary will make legal change more
difficult but may simultaneously open the door to a broad52
based political coalition of progressive forces.

In a post-9/11 world, Professor Johnson is correct about the
limited role courts are willing to take on behalf of immigrants.
Prior to September 11, immigration scholars were predicting the
demise of the plenary power doctrine, which grants Congress
discretion to regulate immigration in the absence of meaningful
53
constitutional scrutiny. This position changed radically after
September 11, and that political tide remains. For example, the
54
conflation of national security and immigration led the U.S.
Supreme Court to issue rulings shortly after 9/11 that reaffirmed
the strength of Congress’s plenary power to control
55
immigration. At the same time, political actors in the federal
and local governments moved to solidify their unfettered power
over immigrants. Congress legislated not only to further restrict
56
judicial review over its immigration powers but also to expand
these powers beyond the border into the regulation of the lives of
57
ordinary citizens within the border. Additionally, the executive
52. Kevin R. Johnson & Bill Ong Hing, The Immigrant Rights Marches of 2006 and
the Prospects for a New Civil Rights Movement, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99, 130 (2007).
53. See, e.g., Gabriel J. Chin, Is There a Plenary Power Doctrine? A Tentative
Apology and Prediction for Our Strange but Unexceptional Constitutional Immigration
Law, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 257, 285 (2000) (describing factual circumstances that lead to
cases that undermine the plenary power doctrine); Peter J. Spiro, Explaining the End of
Plenary Power, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 339, 339 (2002) (naming Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53
(2001), and Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), as two Supreme Court decisions that
pointed toward an end of the plenary power doctrine).
54. See Jennifer M. Chacón, Unsecured Borders: Immigration Restrictions, Crime
Control and National Security, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1827, 1830–31 (2007) (discussing the
national security rhetoric used in calls for immigration reform).
55. See Jennifer Korte Doucleff, Demore v. Kim: Upholding the Unnecessary
Detainment of Legal Permanent Residents, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 625, 625 (2004)
(contrasting the Court’s denial of the indefinite detention of aliens three months prior to
9/11 in Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), with Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003),
in which the Court upheld Congress’s power to impose mandatory detention postremoval); Kevin R. Johnson, Latinas/os and the Political Process: The Need for Critical
Inquiry, 81 OR. L. REV. 917, 919 (2002) (discussing the Supreme Court decision in
Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137 (2002), to deny back pay
remedies to an undocumented worker for NLRB violations).
56. See Daniel Kanstroom, The Better Part of Valor: The REAL ID Act, Discretion,
and the “Rule” of Immigration Law, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 161, 163–66 (2006–07)
(discussing the judicial stripping provisions of the REAL ID Act).
57. See Raquel Aldana & Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, “Aliens” in Our Midst Post-9/11:
Legislating Outsiderness within the Borders, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1683, 1711 (2005)
(“Our key concern . . . is that when the Real ID Act’s driver’s license provisions are
implemented in May 2008, they will become the vehicle for legislating the outsiderness of
noncitizens within our borders.”).
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branch seized the opportunity to employ and expand its
immigration powers to conduct law enforcement,58 while local
59
Finally, local
police became immigration law enforcers.
governments passed hundreds of anti-immigrant measures
restricting immigrants’ access to basic necessities such as
60
housing and drivers’ licenses.
In short, immigrants live in a hostile climate. Certainly,
judicial intervention is still desirable and does make a difference
in some areas. For example, the Second and Ninth Circuits have
reviewed many immigration decisions after the Board of
Immigration Appeal’s streamlining reforms introduced deep
61
flaws in the administrative process. But immigrants need much
more to reverse the tide. A strong civil rights movement
including both electoral and nonelectoral engagement is
essential—whether changes come from the political process at
the local or federal level, or from the courts.
In this brief response, I explore the potentials and limits of this
civil rights struggle on behalf of immigrants in this current climate.
More specifically, I focus on two areas: (1) the role of electoral
politics and Latina/o voters and (2) the role of nonelectoral civil
engagement by Latinos, including noncitizen immigrants. These are
not the only political avenues for mass mobilization on behalf of
immigrants, nor are these alone sufficient to improve the plight of
noncitizens. Johnson and Hing are correct about the need to
broaden the agenda and increase participation beyond immigration
and immigrants respectively to improve the moral legitimacy and
62
effectiveness of any new civil rights movement. Nevertheless,
58. See Raquel Aldana, The September 11 Immigration Detentions and
Unconstitutional Executive Legislation, 29 S. ILL. U. L.J. 5, 6–11 (2004) (tracking the
Attorney General’s increase in immigration enforcement and promulgation of
immigration regulations); Raquel Aldana, Of Katz and “Aliens”: Privacy Expectations and
the Immigration Raids, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 3,
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=993969) (stating that the
lack of congressional action has left the executive branch to intensify immigration raids).
59. See Michael M. Hethmon, The Chimera and the Cop: Local Enforcement of
Federal Immigration Law, 8 UDC/DCSL L. REV. 83, 85 (2004) (describing local
enforcement of federal immigration law as encouraged by the federal government).
60. Raquel Aldana, On Rights, Federal Citizenship, and the “Alien”, 46 WASHBURN
L.J. 263, 283–85 (2007); see also Kevin R. Johnson, Driver’s Licenses and Undocumented
Immigrants: The Future of Civil Rights Law?, 5 NEV. L.J. 213, 216–17 (2004) (arguing
that the limitation of access to driver’s licenses is a civil rights issue).
61. See John R.B. Palmer et al., Why Are So Many People Challenging Board of
Immigration Appeals Decisions in Federal Court? An Empirical Analysis of the Recent
Surge in Petitions for Review, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 77–80 (2005) (tracking the reversal
rates of the Second, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits).
62. Johnson & Hing, supra note 52, at 101; see also Richard Delgado, Locating
Latinos in the Field of Civil Rights: Assessing the Neoliberal Case for Radical Exclusion,
83 TEX. L. REV. 489, 516 (2004) (reviewing GEORGE YANCEY, WHO IS WHITE?: LATINOS,
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Latinos are crucial to this struggle, and the potential for their
mobilization deserves scrutiny. To do this, I have consulted
Professor Johnson’s insightful and prolific assessment of the issue of
63
a civil rights movement and immigration, as well as the writings of
64
other scholars. I focus specifically on whether more recent changes
in the demographics and attitudes among Latinos living in the
United States could improve the cautious outlook toward immigrant
rights that has accompanied much of the literature on Latinos and
political change. For example, is there hope for increased electoral
participation by Latinos? With the recent anti-immigrant climate,
are Latinos more likely to align in greater numbers behind the
plight of immigrants, at least in their demands for greater civil
rights protections? What lessons can be drawn from the potential
for sustained nonelectoral civic engagement among Latinos beyond
the 2006 immigration marches?

ASIANS, AND THE NEW BLACK/NONBLACK DIVIDE (2003)) (critiquing the black–white
paradigm for locating Latinos in the civil rights struggle and arguing for expansion of the
civil rights discourse to improve coalitions among minority groups that move us beyond
the race-based equal protection paradigm); Kevin R. Johnson, The Struggle for Civil
Rights: The Need for, and Impediments to, Political Coalitions Among and Within
Minority Groups, 63 LA. L. REV. 759, 766 (2003) (recognizing the inherent barriers to the
formation of such coalitions).
63. See generally Kevin R. Johnson, The Continuing Latino Quest for Full
Membership and Equal Citizenship: Legal Progress, Social Setbacks, and Political
Promise, in THE COLUMBIA HISTORY OF LATINOS IN THE UNITED STATES SINCE 1960, at
391 (David D. Gutiérrez ed., 2004); Kevin R. Johnson, An Essay on Immigration Politics,
Popular Democracy, and California’s Proposition 187: The Political Relevance and Legal
Irrelevance of Race, 70 WASH. L. REV. 629 (1995); Johnson, supra note 49; Kevin R.
Johnson, Immigration, Civil Rights, and Coalitions for Social Justice, 1 HASTINGS RACE &
POVERTY L.J. 181 (2003); Johnson, supra note 55; Kevin R. Johnson, Law and Politics in
Post-Modern California: Coalition or Conflict Between African Americans, Asian
Americans, and Latina/os?, 4 ETHNICITIES 381 (2004); Kevin R. Johnson, Los Olvidados:
Images of the Immigrant, Political Power of Noncitizens, and Immigration Law and
Enforcement, 1993 BYU L. REV. 1139 (1993); Johnson & Hing, supra note 52; Johnson,
supra note 62.
64. See generally Alianza Conference: Toward a National Latino Agenda, 6 HARV.
LATINO L. REV. 91 (2003); John O. Calmore, Race-Conscious Voting Rights and the New
Demography in a Multiracing America, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1253 (2001); Kathay Feng et al.,
Voting Matters: APIAs, Latinas/os and Post-2000 Redistricting in California, 81 OR. L. REV.
849 (2002); Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, The Latina/o and APIA Vote Post-2000: What Does It
Mean to Move Beyond “Black and White” Politics?, 81 OR. L. REV. 783 (2002); Gerald P.
López, Learning About Latinos, 19 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 363 (1998); M. V. Hood III et.
al., “¡Quedate o Vente!”: Uncovering the Determinants of Hispanic Public Opinion Toward
Immigration, 50 POL. RES. Q. 627 (1997); The Sixth Annual Harvard Latino Law and Policy
Conference: Latino Leadership and Collective Power, 7 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 75 (2004);
Peter Skerry, Citizenship Begins at Home: A New Approach to the Civic Integration of
Immigrants, 14 RESPONSIVE CMTY. 26 (2003); Louis DeSipio, Immigrant Organizing, Civic
Outcomes: Civic Engagement, Political Activity, National Attachment, and Identity in Latino
Immigrant Communities (Ctr. for the Study of Democracy, U.C. Irvine, Paper No. 02’08,
2002), available at http://repositories.cdlib.org/csd/02-08.
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II. ELECTORAL POLITICS AND LATINA/O VOTERS
On September 15, 2007, the Wall Street Journal, in an
article titled Hispanic Voters Flex Political Muscle, observed that
the first Spanish-language debate among Democratic
presidential candidates that aired the prior weekend on
Univision, a Spanish-language television network in the United
65
States, “underscored the growing political clout of Hispanics.”
The article also noted that all Republican candidates except
Senator John McCain refused to attend a similar forum, which
had to be cancelled, and that such nonparticipation “threatens to
unravel the gains made by President Bush, who has aggressively
66
courted Hispanic votes.” The Journal also cautioned that
Republican opposition to immigration reform could further
mobilize Hispanic voters in favor of Democrats, particularly
given the growing number of Hispanics in swing states, such as
67
Florida, Nevada, Colorado, Arizona, and New Mexico.
On November 28, 2007, the New York Times followed with
68
an article titled Walking a Tightrope on Immigration. The
article focused on the Republican and Democratic candidates’
positions on “illegal immigration,” which the author suggested
69
was a politically divisive topic. More interestingly, the article
placed great emphasis on the importance of candidates’ courtship
of the Latino vote in their positions on immigration: “Pollsters on
both sides agree there is widespread anxiety, even anger, about
the impact of illegal immigration. But an increasingly influential
Hispanic electorate could be turned off by a hard line from the
party they turned to in increasing numbers in the last two
70
presidential elections.”
For the past decade, the growing Latino population in the
United States was perceived as a tremendous source of untapped
71
potential political power. Unlike recent reports in major
national newspapers, however, the assessment of whether Latino
65. Nick Timiraos, Hispanic Voters Flex Political Muscle, WALL ST. J., Sept. 15,
2007, at A7.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Michael Luo, Walking a Tightrope on Immigration, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2007,
at WK1.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Compare López, supra note 64, at 363 (writing in 1998 that “Latinos remain
most often on the outskirts of public perception” despite their large numbers), with Lazos
Vargas, supra note 64, at 793 (writing in 2002 that the new politics of close margins plus
the “explosive demographic growth of Latinas/os . . . has made them the new darlings of
the major political parties”).
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electoral participation could adequately safeguard the rights of
immigrants has been more skeptical. Sources of skepticism have
been at least two-fold.72 First, there are very real impediments to
Latino electoral participation, including large pockets of voter
disenfranchisement due to lack of citizenship status, combined
73
with lower overall voter turnout among Latinos. Second,
Latinos, like other racial minority groups, have opinions that
span the political spectrum. “[T]he great heterogeneity of the
Latino community,” Johnson wrote in 1995 on this precise issue,
74
“makes internal agenda-setting a difficult endeavor.”
The assessment appeared a bit more hopeful after the 2002
midterm elections. Analysts of Latino political participation and
outcomes in the elections observed positive trends, evidenced by
improved participatory numbers overall and Latinos’ increased
75
visibility between the parties and among the candidates. Still,
many lamented that actual voter participation, as compared to
increased voter eligibility based on demographic changes and
76
increased (but insufficient) naturalization rates, still lagged
77
quite behind. Moreover, on the immigration issue, the jury was
still out for Latino voters. Some of these same analysts pointed to

72. Other factors include changing demographics and the resulting intergroup
conflicts among minorities, and the creation of majority–minority districts. Walter C.
Farrell, Jr. & James H. Johnson, Jr., Minority Political Participation in the New
Millennium: The New Demographics and the Voting Rights Act, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1215,
1217 (2001). But see Leo F. Estrada, Making the Voting Rights Act Relevant to the New
Demographics of America: A Response to Farrell and Johnson, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1283,
1285–86 (2001) (arguing that demographic change in itself will not lead to intergroup
tensions without other pre-existing conditions).
73. See Rodolfo O. de la Garza & Louis DeSipio, Save the Baby, Change the
Bathwater, and Scrub the Tub: Latino Electoral Participation After Seventeen Years of
Voting Rights Act Coverage, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1479, 1502–03 (1993) (tracking the effects of
the Voting Rights Act on Hispanic electoral participation); see also Johnson, supra note
62, at 768–70 (describing Hispanic voter disenfranchisement as a civil rights issue).
74. Johnson, supra note 49, at 45. In fact, at least some data in the 1990s suggested
that Latinos supported restrictive immigration policies. See Hood III et al., supra note 64,
at 634–42 (recounting a study which showed significant variation between Hispanic
subgroups with regard to immigration issues). But cf. López, supra note 64, at 375–84
(lamenting how understudied Latinos have been as a politically relevant group, while also
criticizing the 1992 Latino National Political Survey for drawing generalized but
ultimately unsubstantiated conclusions regarding Latino anti-immigrant attitudes).
75. Lazos Vargas, supra note 64, at 793–97, 800; see also Johnson, supra note 55, at
921 (contrasting California’s passage of Proposition 187, an anti-immigrant measure,
despite overwhelming opposition by Latinos, with Governor Gray Davis’s conferral of
drivers’ licenses to certain undocumented immigrants, and concluding that efforts by
politicians to “woo Latina/o voters have softened the political rhetoric on immigration”).
76. See Lazos Vargas, supra note 64, at 801 (“Latina/o registration lags by as much
as fourteen and fifteen percentage points behind the registration rates for Whites.”).
77. Id.; see also Johnson, supra note 55, at 930–32 (describing the differing rates of
naturalization and immigration and the effects of both on electoral participation).
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evidence that deep political cleavages continued to divide the
interests of Latino citizens from those of immigrants and
questioned whether the former could offset the rising trend in
78
noncitizen discrimination.
But, are the New York Times and Wall Street Journal correct
in 2007 to predict that Latinos will impact immigration policy?
New studies provide a source of some hope based on actual voting
trends between 2002 and 2006, as well as on projections for
future elections. These studies suggest a trend toward greater
cohesion among Latino voters on issues of immigration. These
indicators alone are unlikely to be sufficient to change the tide
toward more favorable immigration policies, but they cannot be
dismissed entirely.
A. The Numbers: 2006 Elections and Predictions for 2008
According to the Pew Hispanic Center, 5.6 million Latinos
79
voted in the 2006 midterm elections. This number accounted for
5.8% of all votes cast in the election, which is an increase from
80
5.3% in 2002. This increase is largely a function of simple
81
demographic growth among Latinos. Latinos represented nearly
half the total population growth in the past four years with an
82
increase in population of 5.7 million.
Despite this burst in population growth, Latinos continue to
lag behind whites and blacks in voter registration and actual
voting patterns. In fact, demographic factors and participation
rates for 2006 reveal that 13% of the Latino population voted, as
83
compared to 39% of whites and 27% of blacks.
Part of the explanation for lower numbers among Latinos
resides in the high number of ineligible voters. Despite an
84
increase in naturalization rates over the last four years, among
the new population growth, less than one-third (30%) were new
eligible voters (more than one-third were too young and another
78. Lazos Vargas, supra note 64, at 808 (citing PEW HISPANIC CTR. & KAISER
FAMILY FOUND., NATIONAL SURVEY OF LATINOS: THE LATINO ELECTORATE (2002),
available at http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/12.pdf).
79. PEW HISPANIC CTR., THE LATINO ELECTORATE: AN ANALYSIS OF THE 2006
ELECTION 2 (2007), available at http://pewhispanic.org/files/factsheets/34.pdf.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 3.
83. Id. at 2.
84. See Sarah Margon, Naturalization in the United States, MIGRATION INFO.
SOURCE, May 2004, http://migrationinformation.org/USfocus/display.cfm?id=225 (tracking
the immigration trends and the characteristics of the immigrant qualified for
naturalization).
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one-third were noncitizen adults).85 As such, Latino’s portion in
86
comparison with all new eligible voters was merely 20%. By
comparison, whites comprised 24% of the population growth, but
87
46% of all new eligible voters. Thus, for the November 2006
elections, only 39% of all Latinos residing in the United States
were eligible to vote, as compared to 76% of whites and 65% of
88
blacks.
However, voter ineligibility is not the entire explanation for
low Latino electoral participation. In 2006, Latinos were still
89
registering to vote at lower rates than other groups. In addition,
Latino registered voters also voted in fewer percentages than
90
other groups, although foreign-born Latinos voted in higher
91
proportions.
One pressing question is whether more Latinos will
participate in the 2008 election. There is some reason to hope, as
evidenced by voter attitudes and well-organized voting
campaigns by several key players, including unions, grassroots
organizations, and the Latino media. The estimate is that
between ten to twelve million Latinos will be registered to vote
92
by the 2008 presidential election.
For example, in 2007 the “Ya es Hora, Ve y Vota—It’s Time, Go
Vote!” campaign, a coalition of Latino advocacy and media
organizations, began an attempt to naturalize one million legal
93
permanent residents. This effort represents the first time the
Latino media has come together in an integrated manner with
community organizations, unions, and churches—a fact that
participants believe will make a significant difference in Latino
94
voter participation in the next election. According to campaign

85. PEW HISPANIC CTR., supra note 79, at 3.
86. Id. at 2.
87. Id. at 4.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 5. Approximately 54% of Latinos eligible to vote registered for the
November 2006 election, as compared to 71% of whites and 61% of blacks. Id.
90. About 60% of Latinos registered to vote did so in the 2006 election, as compared
to 72% of whites and 67% of blacks. Id.
91. This number was 67%, which was equal to black voter participation. Id. at 6.
92. Press Release, League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC), Maximizing
Latino Power, Defeating Anti-Immigrant Efforts (Oct. 1, 2007), available at
http://www.lulac.org/advocacy/press/2007/latinocongreso.html; see also Jorge Morales
Almada, Tras 10 Millones de Votos Latinos, SECOND ANN. NAT’L LATINO CONGRESO 2007,
Oct. 10, 2007, http://latinocongreso.org/news/php?id=62.
93. Dena Bunis, Coalition Aims to Increase Voter Registration, Turnout, ORANGE
COUNTY REG., Nov. 14, 2007, http://ocregister.com/news/colation-latino-voters-19222525campaign-hispanic.
94. Id.
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organizers, “[b]etween January and September [2007], more than
940,000 green-card holders applied for U.S. citizenship.”95 Moreover,
these new voters are in states that could be new battlegrounds in
96
2008, such as Arizona, New Mexico, Nevada, and Colorado. In
November 2007, the “Ya es Hora, Ve y Vota” campaign unveiled
new phases of their campaign that will include public service
announcements in Latino television, print ads in newspapers, and a
97
dedicated voter registration website. Similarly, Telemundo, a
Spanish language television network, and mun2, the first national
cable network offering bilingual programming for young U.S.
Latinos, launched the “Vota Por Tu Futuro”–”Vote 4 UR Future”
campaign in October 2007, which focuses on registering Latino
98
youths. Surveys of Latinos indicate that Spanish-language media
and nonpartisan voter mobilization efforts are playing a crucial role
99
mobilizing the Latino vote. A notable impediment to this effort,
however, is the backlog created by the increase in naturalization
applications at USCIS, resulting in delays that will deny the
100
opportunity to vote to hundreds of thousands.
In addition, in October 2007, more than 1500 people gathered
in downtown Los Angeles for the Second Annual National Latino
Congreso, a national gathering of Latino leaders in the United
States, to develop a united agenda on mobilizing Latino voting for
the 2008 election and efforts to defeat anti-immigrant efforts
101
nationwide. At the gathering, participants shared their ideas on
community-based Latino mobilization efforts and addressed the
inherent challenges involved in mobilizing a culturally and
102
politically diverse electorate. The group’s goal was to have ten
103
million voters participate in the 2008 election.
95. Id. According to a Pew Hispanic Study, in 2005, the proportion of all legal
permanent residents seeking naturalization rose to 52%, the highest level in a quarter of
a century. JEFFREY S. PASSEL, PEW HISPANIC CTR., GROWING SHARE OF IMMIGRANTS
CHOOSING NATURALIZATION i (2007), available at http://pewhispanic.org/reports/
report.php?ReportID=74.
96. Bunis, supra note 93.
97. Id.
98. Press Release, LULAC, Telemundo and mun2 Unveil National Multi-Platform
“Vota Por Tu Futuro”/”Vote 4 Ur Future” Campaign at the National Press Club in
Washington, D.C. (Oct. 3, 2007), available at http://www.lulac.org/advocacy/press/2007/
telemundo.html.
99. Id.; see also Press Release, National Association of Latino Elected and
Appointed Officials (NALEO), Survey Finds Immigration Issues Driving Latinos to the
Polls (Nov. 7, 2006), available at http://www.naleo.org/pr1106706.html.
100. Spencer S. Hsu, Immigrant Paperwork Backs up at DHS: Delays may Deny Vote
to Hundreds of Thousands, WASH. POST, Nov. 22, 2007, at A01.
101. Press Release, LULAC, supra note 92.
102. Id.
103. Almada, supra note 92.

88

HOUSTON LAW REVIEW

[45:1

Furthermore, a November 2006 survey conducted by the
National Council of La Raza (NCLR) and the National
Association of Latino Elected and Appointed Officials (NALEO)
found that half of all Latino voters surveyed (1,050) reported
104
being “more enthusiastic” about voting than in the past. In the
November 2006 survey, 75% of voters rated their interest in the
election somewhere between eight and ten, an increase from the
105
56% who rated their interest at those levels in September 2006.
Similarly, a 2006 Pew Hispanic Center survey found that threequarters of Latino respondents believe that the immigration
debate will drive more Latinos to vote in the Presidential
106
election.
B. Latino Voters on Immigration
The next question is whether Latino voters still lack a
discernible cohesion as voters on immigration issues, particularly
on such matters as comprehensive immigration reform and antiimmigrant measures. Here, some data suggests that greater
cohesion may be forming among Latinos in support of proimmigration policies, in great part due to the recent fierce
immigration debate and the increasingly visible mistreatment of
immigrants.
Based on a 2006 national survey of 2000 Latino adults on
107
the immigration debate, the Pew Hispanic Center concluded
that “Latinos are feeling more discriminated against, politically
energized and unified following the immigration policy debate
108
and the pro-immigration marches this spring.” In this survey,
approximately 14% of Latinos refer to immigration “as the most
important problem facing the country today, second only to the
109
Similarly, the November 2006
war in Iraq (22%).”
NCLR/NALEO survey also found that, while only 9% of
respondents reported immigration as their primary concern, “a
majority of Latinos (51%), including half of young voters,
reported that immigration was “the most important or one of the

104. Press Release, NALEO, supra note 99.
105. Id.
106. ROBERT SURO & GABRIEL ESCOBAR, PEW HISPANIC CTR., 2006 NATIONAL SURVEY
OF LATINOS: THE IMMIGRATION DEBATE 6 (2006), available at http://pewhispanic.org/
files/reports/68.pdf.
107. Id. at 1.
108. Id. at i.
109. Id. at 21. The immigration issue creates a large division between the native and
the foreign born. Foreign-born Latinos are three times more likely than the native born to
view immigration as the most important problem facing the nation (20% versus 6%). Id.

2008]

SILENT VICTIMS NO MORE?

89

most important issues in deciding their vote.”110 The 2006 Pew
Hispanic Latino Survey on Immigration also revealed a
somewhat greater sense of solidarity among Latinos of different
nationalities. Now, “58% of Latinos see fellow Hispanics from
different countries working together to achieve common political
111
goals, versus 34% who say they are not working together.”
But what do these numbers mean in terms of specific issues
affecting immigrants? The 2006 Pew Hispanic Latino Survey on
Immigration revealed that Latinos, who now as a group feel more
discriminated against as a result of the immigration debate, also
express somewhat more favorable views towards immigrants on
112
two issues. First, “[a] greater share of native-born Latinos
(45%) now favors increasing the number of legal immigrants
from Latin America,” although that number is higher among the
113
foreign born, with nearly half (48%) in favor. Among all Latinos
surveyed, the majority (72%) believes undocumented immigrants
114
help the economy. These trends are higher than they were in
115
2002.
In addition, 41% of Latinos opine that those “who have been
in the country for at least five years should be permitted to
116
stay.” In contrast to the general public, moreover, only 5% of
Latinos believe that no undocumented immigrants should be
117
On these issues,
allowed to remain and become citizens.
however, there are divisions between the foreign-born and
native-born Latinos, with 61% of all foreign born saying that all
undocumented should be able to stay as compared to only 51% of
118
native born. Here, the strongest indicators of opinions and
positions regarding these issues are family ties and direct
119
experiences concerning immigration.
Between 55% and 70% of surveyed Latinos favor temporary
workers, while a large minority (between 30% and 40%) oppose
120
them. The opposition encompasses views that range from those

110. Press Release, NALEO, supra note 99.
111. SURO & ESCOBAR, supra note 106, at 10.
112. Id. at 2.
113. Id. at 2, 17.
114. Id. at 15. A minority of Latinos, 21%, say that undocumented immigrants hurt
the economy by driving down wages. Id. The number is even higher among native-born
Latinos; 28% see economic harm from undocumented immigration. Id. at 16.
115. Id. at 2.
116. Id. at 15.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 19.
119. Id.
120. Id.
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who do not want any form of legalization to those who view such
programs as impractical or insufficiently generous to
immigrants.121
On enforcement issues, “[m]ost Latinos (66%) oppose
building fences between the U.S.–Mexico border, and even more
122
A slight
(70%) are against sending the National Guard.”
majority (51%) opposes increasing the number of border patrol
123
Here too, however, there are greater differences
agents.
between the native-born and foreign-born Latinos, with a slight
majority of native born (53%) favoring additional border patrol
agents, while a majority (59%) of foreign born opposes that
124
Differences also arose on employer immigration
increase.
verification databases, with about 42% of foreign-born Latinos
125
and 70% of native-born Latinos supporting the database.
Unfortunately, the 2006 Pew Hispanic Latino Survey on
Immigration did not ask specific questions on other key questions
affecting Latinos today, particularly in regard to the hundreds of
anti-immigrant measures that were adopted following 9/11.
These include restrictions on undocumented immigrants’ access
to driver’s licenses, public benefits, and higher education, as well
as sanctions for employers or landlords who employ or lease to
126
Results from local antithe undocumented, respectively.
immigrant measures provide some evidence that the Latino
electorate
overwhelmingly
opposes
these
restrictive
127
regulations, but greater research is needed.
In general, within electoral politics, Latino demographic
trends are increasing the influence of the Latino electorate, while
the current immigration debate appears to be motivating greater
Latino political participation. These are important trends that
elected representatives and candidates cannot—and should not—
ignore. Nevertheless, these trends alone cannot sufficiently turn
the tide against the nation’s fierce anti-immigrant climate.

121. Id. at 20.
122. Id. at 17.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 18.
125. Id. at 19.
126. See Aldana, supra note 60, at 272–74, 278–84.
127. For example, 77% of Latinos voted against California’s anti-immigration
Proposition 187. Jan Adams, Proposition 187 Lessons, ZMAGAZINE, Mar. 1995, available
at http://www.zmag.org/zmag/articles/mar95adams.htm. More recently, however, only
53% of Latinos voted against Arizona’s anti-immigrant Proposition 200. Sam Francis,
Proposition 200, Tancredo Re-Election Not What Immigration Enthusiasts Want to Hear,
VDARE.COM, Nov. 18, 2004, http://www.vdare.com/francis/041118_election.htm.
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Consider, for example, that to date, despite these trends,
neither major national party, Democrat or Republican, has made a
128
firm commitment to tackle anti-immigrant policies. Their failure
to do so may partly explain why Latinos are also not firmly
committing to either party, despite their greater alliance around
immigration issues. Analysts of the Latino electorate reveal that
Latino voters are “to some extent holding the Republican Party
responsible for what they perceive to be the negative consequences
129
of the immigration debate,” but they disagree more on the actual
political impact of that assessment. Some see at least short-term
Latino partisanship moving strongly toward the Democrats as a
direct response to some Republicans’ strong opposition to
comprehensive immigration reform and the perceived mean130
spiritedness of the debate in the Republican-controlled House.
Others, however, observe that the Democratic Party has not made
significant gains among Latinos and, by some measure, may have
131
The 2006 Pew Hispanic Latino Survey on
lost support.
Immigration, moreover, reported that one out of every four Latinos
believe that neither political party offers the best option on
immigration issues, more than three times those who felt this way
132
two years ago. Similarly, 37% of Latinos favor Democrats, while
the same percentage sees no difference between the parties; this
number, however, shifts significantly in favor of Democrats among
registered Latino voters (46%) versus the 9% favoring Republicans
133
when asked which party has more concern for Latinos.
One significant task, therefore, is to assess why political
parties are not being sufficiently pro-immigrant. One explanation
may reside still in the low numbers of the Latino electorate,
134
which is estimated now to be around 9%. Another explanation
may be that despite greater pro-immigrant stances among
135
Latinos in recent times, these issues still divide Latinos.
Nevertheless, this picture is only part of the story. The attitudes
128. See Maria Arhancet, Platforms of Presidential Candidates Regarding
Immigration Reform, 21 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 507, 507–09 (2007) (providing a brief summary
of 2008 Republican and Democratic presidential candidate positions on immigration
reform).
129. SURO & ESCOBAR, supra note 106, at i.
130. RODOLFO DE LA GARZA & LOUIS DESIPIO, TOMÁS RIVERA POLICY INSTITUTE
CONFERENCE SUMMARY, NEW DIMENSIONS OF LATINO PARTICIPATION 1–2 (2006), available
at http://www.trpi.org/PDFs/dimensions.pdf.
131. SURO & ESCOBAR, supra note 106, at 12–14.
132. Id. at 13.
133. Id.
134. See Timiraos, supra note 65.
135. See supra notes 106–25 and accompanying text (describing results from a
survey of Latino voters).
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and activism of other voters with regard to immigration also
affect the debate. For example, while small in numbers, radical
anti-immigrant groups are very effective at mobilizing against
136
Perhaps more importantly, the
pro-immigrant proposals.
ambivalence among Latino voters on some issues, such as
increased immigration or legalization proposals, is at times
shared in greater numbers among groups who might otherwise
137
be allies in the civil rights struggle. While a full analysis of this
issue is beyond the scope of this Article, any civil rights struggle
on behalf of immigrants must address the issue of integrating
into the movement other progressive voices.
III. THE PROMISE OF NONELECTORATE LATINO CIVIC
ENGAGEMENT: THE 2006 IMMIGRATION MARCHES AND BEYOND
Any analysis of nonelectorate Latino civic engagement must
consider the notable 2006 pro-immigration marches. For three
months between March 10 and May 1, 2006, these marches
attracted about five million Latino immigrants and their
supporters to demand legalization for immigrants and to oppose
138
which would have criminalized
the Sensebrenner bill,
undocumented immigrants and those organizations that provided
139
assistance to them. In some cities, these were the largest
demonstrations in their history, and nationwide, these marches
constituted the largest mobilization of immigrants in U.S.
140
history.
Professor Johnson, along with Professor Bill Ong Hing, was
among the first legal scholars to analyze the prospects for a new
civil rights movement based on the 2006 immigration rights
141
marches. Their assessment, however, was tamed enthusiasm at
best, and even doubtful, at least for its future prospects. Johnson
and Hing acknowledged, for instance, that at the outset, the

136. See Robert Pear, High-Tech Titans Strike Out on Immigration Bill, N.Y. TIMES,
June 25, 2007, at A16 (stating that anti-immigrant groups are well organized, making it
difficult to pass immigration legislation).
137. See, e.g., Rodolfo O. de la Garza & Louis DeSipio, Interests Not Passions:
Mexican–American Attitudes Toward Mexico, Immigration from Mexico, and Other Issues
Shaping U.S.–Mexico Relations, 32 INT’L MIGRATION REV. 401, 408–16 (1998) (examining
Latino attitudes on various immigration issues).
138. Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act of 2005,
H.R. 4437, 109th Cong. §§ 203, 205 (2005); see Johnson & Hing, supra note 52, at 100.
139. Victor Narro et al., The 2006 Immigrant Uprising: Origins and Future, 16 NEW
LAB. F. 49, 49–50 (2007).
140. Id.
141. See Johnson & Hing, supra note 52, at 101 (discussing the potential for a new,
broad-based civil rights movement in the wake of the 2006 marches).
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marches seemed to stall the Sensenbrenner bill.142 Ultimately,
however, they conceded that not only did comprehensive
immigration reform fail to pass, but Congress voted to expand
143
In addition, Johnson and Hing
the U.S.–Mexican fence.
highlight various shortcomings in the movement, including its
144
its
narrow reactionary focus on anti-immigrant legislation,
failure to attract a broader coalition of supporters, especially
145
among African Americans, and even reservations as to its
146
sustainability. All of these observations are fair criticisms of the
March 2006 marches. However, they also overlook a host of
highly significant lessons to be drawn from them and the
potential contributions these could make going forward.
The sustainability of any immigrant civil rights movement
should not depend alone on the continued visibility of mass
mobilizations of immigrants, as it is often the efforts behind the
scenes, away from the spotlight, that matter the most. These
marches cannot be viewed in isolation as separate from decadeslong grassroots immigrant rights movement or as sporadic
reactionary mobilizations. Part of the explanation for the
unprecedented and surprisingly large numbers of protesters
certainly resides in spontaneous and organic mobilization from
various groups, including young high school and elementary
147
school students; but, the marches had their roots in the work of
local advocates of immigration reform, labor unions, churches,
148
and others in the Latino community. Not long before, in 2003,
nearly 1000 immigrants and allies rode to Washington, D.C.
demanding basic rights and civil liberties for immigrant
149
workers. This movement, inspired by the Freedom Rides of the
Civil Rights Movement, also had roots in a coalition of unions,
immigrant rights groups, community organizations, and lawyer
150
activists, and sought to make visible on the national stage the
less noticed everyday work of immigrant rights organizers locally
in the workplace, schools, courts, and administrative agencies.
142. Id. at 104.
143. Id. at 100–01.
144. Id. at 103.
145. Id. at 116–20.
146. See id. at 100 (observing that by the summer of 2006, there were signs that the
immigrant rights movement had “lost steam”).
147. See id. at 103 (describing the movement as reminiscent of the 1960s Civil Rights
movement).
148. DE LA GARZA & DESIPIO, supra note 130, at 3.
149. Victor Narro & Dan Gregor, People’s Lawyering on the Bus: How a Small Band
of NLG Members Became the Legal Vanguard for Immigrant Freedom Riders, 63 GUILD
PRAC. 65, 65 (2006).
150. Id. at 65–66.
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Thus, while the high visibility of marches or freedom rides
matters, more significant are the numerous grassroots
organizations promoting and creating civic engagement among
Latinos living in the United States.
Across the United States, numerous churches, labor unions,
and immigrant rights groups are organizing Latinos, recently
arrived or not, to participate more actively in promoting change
in the schools their children attend, in local elections against
anti-immigrant measures, or in lobbying their local
representatives in the adoption of pro-immigrant policies, and
even in improving the lot of their families back home by pushing
151
for reforms in their home countries. Studies assessing the effect
of Latino participation in community-based efforts reveal that
such activities spark broader civic engagement, including among
the poor, and vest Latinos with resources necessary to take on
152
individualistic forms of politics. Immigrants need institutional
guidance to integrate into U.S. society, and of course, to
153
encourage political participation. This is particularly true in
immigrant populations for whom electoral participation is not an
option. A more balanced approach toward civil integration of
immigrants in the United States, therefore, must move beyond
simple naturalization drives. Furthermore, greater civic
integration is necessary to address the challenges posed by
nonparticipation of second and third generation immigrants who
154
Nonelectoral
are eligible voters but disengaged from politics.
participation, for example, has the potential to raise Latino group
consciousness, which increases how much Latinos engage in
155
political participation.

151. See, e.g., Ruth Milkman, Introduction to ORGANIZING IMMIGRANTS: THE
CHALLENGE FOR UNIONS IN CONTEMPORARY CALIFORNIA 2–24 (Ruth Milkman ed., 2000)
(observing the “cultural assimilation” and “economic integration” of immigrants achieved
through union participation); Wilfredo Bolivar et al., Unleash the Power of
Immigrants . . . Organize!, 33 SOC. POL’Y 30 (2003) (describing the requirements for the
effective organization of immigrants and noting some of the achievements of PACT
(People Acting for Community Together), a Miami-based immigrant organization group);
Luis Escala Rabadan, Human Rights and Mexican Migrant Associations in California, 3
MIGRACIONES INTERNATIONALES, 84–107 (2005); Kirk Noden, Building Power in Forty
Languages: A Story About Organizing Immigrants in Chicago’s Albany Park, 33 SOC.
POL’Y 47, 47–52 (2003) (chronicling the efforts and lessons learned through organizing
immigrants in one of the nation’s most ethnically diverse communities).
152. See Randal C. Archibold, Strategy Sessions Fueled Immigrant Marches, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 12, 2006, at A16 (describing the “snowball effect” of grassroots efforts that
became a turning point, inspiring and empowering people).
153. Skerry, supra note 64, at 28.
154. Id. at 36.
155. See Atiya Kai Stokes, Latino Group Consciousness and Political Participation,
31 AM. POL. RES. 361, 369–71 (2003) (finding that increasing group consciousness among
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Aside from promoting a culture of political participation, civic
engagement by immigrants has other important benefits for
political participation among already eligible voters. Studies
reveal, for example, that due to education and socio-economic
levels, Latino voters generally possess a disturbingly low
156
knowledge about political issues when they vote. Studies also
reveal that voters with low levels of information, such as Latinos,
rely more heavily on candidate likeability, rather than a firm
knowledge of issues, sometimes to the detriment of their own
157
Greater civic engagement, however, increases
interests.
political information capital, which allows voters to make
informed decisions about voting as opposed to voting for
158
This is particularly
candidates on the basis of popularity.
important when considering immigration policy and particular
issues, such as guest worker programs. While guest worker
programs on their face seem pro-immigrant, division exists
among immigrant advocates about whether they help or hurt
159
immigrant workers.
The 2006 marches themselves, in fact, promoted a culture of
greater political participation, increased group consciousness,
and increased political information capital; all of which could
translate to more positive outcomes in the local and national
political landscape for immigrants. This is a benefit of the 2006
marches that Johnson and Hing acknowledge in their assessment
when noting that political culture involves more than voting and
registration rates, especially for noncitizen immigrants ineligible
160
to vote. The evidence, however, suggests that even among
eligible voters, the marches could still make a difference at the
urns. NALEO’s 2006 survey, for example, revealed a strong
linkage between likely voters and those who participated in the
marches and rallies. Nearly one-third of voters said they or
161
someone close to them participated in the marches.

Latinos in turn increases their overall involvement in the political process).
156. Stephen P. Nicholson et al., Political Knowledge and Issue Voting Among the
Latino Electorate, 59 POL. RES. Q. 259, 260 (2006).
157. See id. at 268–69 (arguing that uninformed Latino voters may have supported
President George W. Bush in the 2000 election based on misinformation about just how
Latino friendly he was, whereas more informed voters recognized that Al Gore would
likely adopt policies more favorable to Latinos).
158. Id. at 261.
159. See, e.g., Narro et al., supra note 139, at 51–53 (documenting labor’s intragroup
dissention and intergroup dissention with other immigrant rights advocates over guest
worker proposals).
160. Johnson & Hing, supra note 52, at 127.
161. Press Release, NALEO, supra note 99.
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The evidence also suggested greater Latino group
consciousness as a result of the marches. A study conducted by
the Pew Hispanic Center, for example, revealed that almost twothirds of Latinos think the pro-immigrant marches signal the
162
beginning of a new and lasting social movement. A majority of
respondents also believe that Latinos are working together
163
toward common goals. Indeed, Latino mobilization against antiimmigrant measures, rather than revealing a weakness, helped
to solidify greater Latino group cohesiveness on a broader
164
antidiscrimination agenda, regardless of immigration status.
Another potential benefit of the marches was the involvement of
youth, which will hopefully translate to their greater electoral
participation in the future.
Thus, even if marches of the same scale do not resurface, or
even if they do not actually alter immigration policy right away,
this should not be the sole measurement of their success. Rather,
their real legacy will be in promoting greater grassroots
involvement among Latinos when they return to their
communities, or a greater interest in and more informed political
participation. At a minimum, the immigrant marches re165
Today, various
energized the immigrant rights movement.
coalitions are advancing a plan of action that focuses on voter
registration, citizenship drives, community forums, and other
166
mobilizations and rallies. The marches allowed key groups in
this movement to air out and begin to address their differences,
as was the case between unions and immigrant rights advocates
who parted ways on philosophical differences over certain
167
policies and tactics. Hopefully, this airing of conflict, which is a
necessary part of any sustainable movement, will facilitate
coalition building and enable the aim to be broader in the future
by including, for example, the voices of African Americans.
Johnson, Hing, and others see potential on the issue of workers’
168
rights as a unifying theme of this broader coalition.
162. SURO & ESCOBAR, supra note 106, at 8.
163. Id. at 10.
164. See, e.g., S. Karthick Ramakrishnan & Thomas J. Espenshade, Immigrant
Incorporation and Political Participation in the United States, 35 INT’L MIGRATION REV.
870, 893 (2001) (documenting that anti-immigrant legislation provokes first and second
generation immigrants to coalesce politically).
165. Narro et al., supra note 139, at 56.
166. Id.; see also supra notes 92–101 and accompanying text (discussing recent voter
registration efforts).
167. Narro et al., supra note 139, at 53–54.
168. Johnson & Hing, supra note 52, at 116–25; see also Jennifer Gordon & R. A.
Lenhardt, Citizenship Talk: Bridging the Gap Between Immigration and Race
Perspectives, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2493, 2516–19 (suggesting “work as a path to
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IV. CONCLUSION
The anti-immigrant climate is currently strong at the local
and national levels. Turning the political tide to favor
immigrants will require an equally strong political response from
pro-immigrant allies. The growing numbers of Latinos in the
169
United States, many of whom are immigrants and, among
170
them, many of whom are undocumented, makes them potential
allies in the struggle of immigrants for greater rights in this
country. There are some positive signs in this regard. In the
electoral process, Latinos appear more prepared now than before
to vote, and motivated to do so in great part by a desire to
counter anti-immigrant policies, which they perceive as also
discriminating against Latinos. There is also a trend for greater
civic engagement by Latinos particularly at the local level, even
among those ineligible to vote. This trend is especially important
as the federal government devolves in this area, while states
seize greater immigration powers. Latinos alone will not
determine U.S. immigration policy, but all of these trends reveal
that they are becoming an important voice in a much needed civil
rights movement on behalf of immigrants in this country.
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